CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AT  FIRE SUPPORT BASE CORAL
by Captain Ian AHEARN of 102^nd (Coral) Field Battery

In May 1968 there were eleven allied brigades operating in the "Rocket Belt" around the Saigon/Bien Hoa area. The 1 RAR Battle Group, including 102^nd (Coral) Field Battery, joined those forces in early May. The battery first occupied Fire Support Patrol Base (FSPB) Harrison some 15 kms East of Long Dien and proceeded to support 1RAR in the mission to suppress NVA rocket attacks on the US bases at Bear cat and Long Bien.

On the 10^th May, 1968, II Field Force Vietnam (II FFV- known as "Two Field Force Victor") requested that
1 ATF be deployed into AO Surfers, a Tactical Area of Operations (TAOR) north of Saigon on the Southern edge of the infamous War Zone D. The Australians were to block enemy escape routes from Saigon to Cambodia in the aftermath of their Tet Offensive. Unfortunately, at that time the NVA was involved in reinforcing their elements around Saigon.

The 1 ATF concept of operations was:

3 Battalion Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR) was to deploy to the area by helicopter on 12^th May, 1968 and secure FSPB Coral for the subsequent fly-in of I RAR and the guns of 12 Field Regiment. 3 RAR was then to conduct blocking operations in the western part of AO Surfers.

I RAR was to deploy to the eastern part of AO Surfers and the 2/35 Artillery Battalion (US), Headquarters 1 ATF, Task Force Maintenance Area (TFMA) and armoured elements were to deploy to FSPB Coral by road on 13^th May, 1968.

The Battalion tasks were as follows:

I RAR.

Establish 102^nd (Coral) Field Battery at FSPB Coral

Clear Route 16 to Tan Uyen and secure it for the road move by the rest of the Australian Task Force

Establish blocking positions to interdict enemy withdrawal routes from the South and South West.

3 RAR.

Secure the Landing Zone at FSPB Coral for the fly-in of Task Force airborne elements.

Establish blocking positions to interdict enemy withdrawal routes from the South and South West.

Provide a company to defend FSPB Coral.

In summary, the Task Force was deployed to prevent enemy withdrawal from the South.

12 Field Regiment reconnaissance party consisting of the Second-in-Command's (2IC) Group and the reconnaissance parties from 102 and 161 (NZ) Field Batteries landed by helicopter at about noon on 12^th May. The Group was led by Major Brian Murtagh and Lieutenants Ian Ahearn (102 Bty) and Rod Baldwin (161 Bty) were in charge of their individual battery parties. Baldwin and Ahearn travelled in the same helicopter and discussed the possible locations of their respective batteries in the expected regimental gun position. In accordance with normal practice the two officers expected that the three batteries of 12 Field Regiment would be deployed in an area about 400 metres square. The proposed area for the FSPB was marked on both officers maps and as the helicopter circled the proposed area was clearly identifiable.

Upon deplaning, the battery parties were surprised to find the area secured by US troops. There was no sign of 3 RAR nor the 2IC's party and it was observed that at that time some 4km to the south major air strikes were taking place.  Discussions with the Americans on the ground revealed that they had been in the area for some time and had been engaged in heavy fire fights with the NVA. The OC of the US infantry company prophetically commented "Charlie will come looking for you...you won't have to find him".

At this time there was no sign of the 2IC and an element of his party so radio contact was established and he advised that he was "not far away". The Battery Captain (BK) of 161 Battery was still trying to establish the location of the 2IC when the Chinooks carrying the 161 guns arrived overhead. At this stage none of the drills associated with the layout of a regimental gun position had been carried out and although the Battery Captain (BK) of 161 attempted to delay the landing of the guns, the Chinook flight leader insisted that the guns be accepted. The guns were accepted when the 2IC repeated that he was not far away and the Kiwis could accept their guns in their present location. That location was the location for the Regimental position as briefed in the orders.

The 102 Recce Party was instructed to move to join the 2IC. The latter was unable to give an accurate location and was requested to throw smoke. A smoke grenade was ignited to the North East and Ahearn took a compass bearing to that location before moving off with the 102^nd (Coral) Battery party and the balance of the Regimental party to locate the 2IC. The 2IC was eventually located some 1500 metres away and on arrival at his location Ahearn indicated the considerable distance that now separated the batteries. Murtagh was not concerned indicating that the position needed to be large to accommodate all the elements of the Task Force that were to be deployed. Ahearn informed him that there had been no contact with the 3 RAR elements and requested information on their location. Murtagh replied that they were "over there" pointing to the South West. 102^nd (Coral) Field Battery staff never discovered where "over there" was.

At this stage the physical location of the proposed 102^nd (Coral) Battery position had been determined by compass bearing and pacing from the initial fly-in point. To fix the location more precisely the 102^nd (Coral) Battery party, equipped with survey instruments, moved to what appeared to be a group of buildings to the West. The buildings proved to be the ruins of some rubber plantation facilities and the party, using their location as a basis, took bearings back to the selected Battery Centre. As they moved back along the track they noticed a large number of earth mounds under the surviving rubber trees. On investigation they proved to be a large number of freshly dug shell scrapes from which were retrieved two untarnished AK 47 rounds and some sweet paper wrappers embossed with a picture of Ho Chi Minh.

The finds were reported to Murtagh who indicated that the information was of no consequence.

The 102 Recce Party completed the layout of the Gun Position and awaited the arrival of the guns. The first Chinooks began to arrive but contained elements of I RAR and not the expected main body of 102^nd (Coral) Field Battery. Delays began to occur in the fly-in and 1 RAR was not on the ground complete until approximately 1600 hours. The guns did not start to arrive until after this time and further delays meant that the battery defence stores were among the last sorties. Once the guns were deployed it was decided to order all personnel to dig personnel sleeping/weapon pits to Stage 1(approximately four feet deep) rather than the normal eighteen inch shell scrapes. This decision was deliberately made in view of the indications of nearby enemy activity.

The battery bulldozer and defence stores were among the last sorties. The bull dozer was put to work first on the CP, the battery ammunition bunker and then, by pure luck on Gun numbers 4,5 and 6 which were the northern most guns. At this stage the centre of arc for the battery was 1600 mils which meant that all the guns were pointing East.

1RAR Battalion Headquarters was not concentrated until about 1700 hours at which time it was decided that it would remain in the vicinity of Coral and not move to its planned location 2000 metres to the North East until the following day. At about 1700 hrs the last sorties delivered the 1 RAR mortars and these were sited on the left of the gun position.

At this stage it was normal practice to hold an Orders Group to co-ordinate the defence of the FSPB but no orders were held and as observed by Lieutenant Tony Jensen, the Officer Commanding 1 RAR Mortar Platoon, "The defence of the FSPB was not fully developed..."

The defensive arrangements for FSPB Coral at last light were as follows:

• No defensive barbed wire had been laid due to the late arrival of defence stores.

• Coordination of arcs of fire of MGs was not carried out to an overall plan laid down by the FSPB commander but left to the initiative of sub element commanders.

• No Claymore anti-personnel mines were sighted due to confusion over the location of elements of 3 RAR.

• Despite the late occupation of the fire support base all defensive activity was ordered to cease at stand to at last light.

• The FSPB defence net and telephone system was not fully established.

At approximately 0245 hrs (local time) a number of Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) were fired into 102 Battery's position at FSPB CORAL. Almost simultaneously the machine gunners of No 4 and No 6 gun began to fire at the enemy assault line that had appeared about 60 metres from their positions. Both Machine Gun pits were located forward of their respective guns.

The machine gunner of No 6 gun fired a burst and was then forced to withdraw when the enemy rushed the pit. As the two sentries (each MG post was manned by two personnel) moved back to the bund around No 6 gun they were subjected to intense small arms fire. The machine gunner was wounded in the hand and was forced to drop his M60.

Following up very quickly, the enemy threw themselves against the bund around No 6 gun and began throwing grenades and directing machine gun fire into the pit. The gun detachment was forced to withdraw to No 5 gun pit where both gun detachments began to engage the enemy with small arms fire.

On the right flank, the machine gunner from No 4 gun was forced to withdraw to his gun pit when his M60 jammed. No 4 detachment also began to engage the enemy with small arms fire.

Enemy RPG and small arms fire was now intense. Despite the heavy incoming fire all gun detachments were "standing to" at their gun positions. The detachments in Nos 4 and 6 pits began to call for Small arms ammunition and they were resupplied by runners from the ammunition bay

Although the gun communications system (a loudspeaker system known as the Tannoy system connected each gun to the Command Post [CP]) was shot to pieces (only No 5 speaker and intermittently No 4 speaker were working) the Command Post was aware that No 6 gun was in enemy hands. No 4 requested permission to fire SPLINTEX (anti-personnel 105mm rounds that contained thousands of flechette darts) and was ordered to do so.  The detachments first line ammunition was quickly expended as each gun carried only six SPLINTEX rounds. SPLINTEX rounds from other guns were quickly carried to No 4 gun before the detachment expended all of the readily available first line splintex and the detachment was then ordered to fire High Explosive (HE) rounds.  The gun was then ordered to fire HE rounds over open sights in an attempt to prevent the enemy from overrunning the position.

At approximately 0315 hrs enemy fire was still intense from the front of the battery position. In addition there were at least two enemy snipers active, one in the tree line to the left flank and one to the rear of the position.

At this stage a fire mission was called for (initiated by one of the companies of 1 RAR who were also in contact at that time - from memory it was D Coy). Orders had to be relayed by voice from outside the CP and passed on by other personnel. Three guns began to fire on the mission even though the position was still under ground attack and receiving heavy incoming fire. Enemy soldiers were actually in the pit of No 6 gun; No 4 gun was firing over open sights and No 2 gun had been hit in the trail by an RPG round which had also destroyed a tyre. One of the detachment of No 2 gun had been wounded when the round struck the gun. (No 5 gun was manned but it was laid on No 6 gun in case the enemy decided to move it).

Although the position was still under fire the enemy assault had by then swung to the left flank through the mortar position (1 RAR). Two of the wounded mortar soldiers managed to crawl from their position into No 5 gun pit.

No 4 gun began to call for ammunition and all spare personnel were used to ferry ammunition to the guns (a reserve had been formed from the off duty Command Post staff and was held centrally behind the CP). At approximately 0400 hrs the ammunition bunker of No 1 gun was hit by a RPG round, but whilst some charge bags in the rounds ignited they did not explode. Although the detachment received assistance from some  signallers and surveyors and attempts made to control the blaze, the bunker was completely burned out.  

Light Fire Teams (LFT) (helicopter gun ships) appeared over the position at about 0345 hrs. From this time until dawn the LFT's put down heavy fire around the perimeter.

The battery continued to fire missions employing four guns. No 2 gun had been brought into action by extensive manhandling. No 4 gun detachment continued to fire rounds over open sights at the enemy that could still be seen in front of their pit. The HE rounds from No 4 gun were exploding 100 metres from the gun; one round passed through the bund before exploding amongst the enemy.

Enemy in No 6 gun's MG pit began to engage the position with the M60 dropped by the wounded gunner. Using M79 grenade launchers and small arms the detachment in No 5 pit killed the two enemy operating the weapon and silenced the Machine Gun's fire.

Although the personnel in No 5's pit had repeatedly called out to the mortar position they received no answer. At approximately 0500 hrs however, the CP received orders to engage the area of the mortar position with SPLINTEX. No 5 gun fired five rounds across the mortar position; these rounds proved very effective.

Just before dawn the mortar position acknowledged the calls made to them. They requested help to withdraw to the gun position. Six men were sent from No 5 gun pit to sweep through to No 6 gun pit and forward of the mortars. This group contacted and killed two enemy in their sweep; they then went to ground while a second group moved out to aid the mortars.

At approximately 0630 hrs the enemy broke contact. Thirty eight enemy bodies were found in and around the perimeter. Two enemy wounded were captured. A large number of weapons including 9 AK 47 Assault Rifles, SKS rifles, RPG launchers and Bangalore Torpedoes were recovered along with a large quantity of ammunition.

Two members of 102^nd (Coral) Field Battery were wounded, five mortar soldiers were killed and eight wounded; two men from 12 Field Regiment RHQ were killed and another three were wounded. Whilst under heavy attack the battery fired three fire missions. No 4 gun fired 84 rounds over open sights and No 5 fired 5 rounds over open sights in defence of the position.

On 16 May 68 at approximately 0245 hrs, FSPB CORAL again came under heavy attack. I RAR had by then moved it's companies in around the gun position and this unit bore the brunt of the ground attack. Both 102^nd (Coral) Field Battery and "A" Battery 2/35 US Artillery Battalion (The "Husky Alpha's" had moved into CORAL on 14 May) received heavy mortar fire.

Two guns of 102^nd (Field) Battery were put out of action by the mortar fire. The gun position once again came under heavy small arms fire.

During this attack, despite heavy incoming fire, the battery fired simultaneous section missions from 0315 hrs until dawn. Once again all gun communications were destroyed. All orders had to be relayed by voice; this was made difficult by the activities of a sniper who gave the Battery Command Post his undivided attention.

102^nd (Coral) Field Battery's Last Mission:

The day that 102^nd (Coral) Field Battery returned to Australia Dick Gray  and I remained behind in Nui Dat to be absorbed into 105 Field Battery.

Sadly we waved off the battery members as they climbed into trucks to be taken to the Nui Dat airstrip for transport to Saigon.

105 Field Battery was still in transit from Australia via Siagon to Nui Dat.

About lunchtime a Special Air Service patrol called contacted the battery position by radio and requested a fire mission on a truck carrying three men which they had observed north of the Australian base out near Nui Nghe.

It was just as well that all gunners are trained to be gun numbers regardless of whether they have technical or administrative postings as this enabled a few of us to man three guns with cooks, drivers, storemen and an odd gunner or two.  Three lots of three rounds were 'fired for effect' before 'end of mission' was given.

The SAS reported that the truck was destroyed and three enemy soldiers killed. 

When 105 Battery arrived at Nui Dat a short time later the new Battery Commander was elated and decided that he was going to fly out to have a look at the truck. 

Here was a chance to see what we had done for once, I decided that Dickie Gray and I should go too, so I told Dick to grab his weapon and come with me to the helipad. 

When Dick queried what we were supposed to be doing I just told him to follow my lead.

While waiting for the chopper to arrive we were asked by one of the new officers 'Who are you?'

To which we replied 'We're your protection party' and climbed straight on board the chopper when it landed. No doubt the officer felt much safer for our presence as he didn't ask any more questions.

On flying over the wreck I took photos as the 105 Battery Commander commented, 'Well, that's 105 Battery's first kill'.

Both Dick and I chimed in, 'Frogshit! that's 102 Battery's last kill.'  The new officers glared at us.

Strangely enough Dick and I were transferred to 104 Field Battery the next day.

The following photos are of a newspaper article and photo of destroyed truck taken by Ray Carlin.

'The Toucan Battery Blues'

This song is (was) the theme song for former members of 102 Field Battery, Royal Australian Artillery and allied units, on the occasion of their reunion in Sydney, April 2015.

Traditionally, 102 Field Battery has been known affectionately as 'the Toucan Battery' and its mascot is the toucan bird.

Words: Trevor Bryant (ex 102 Battery, Vietnam 1968)

Music: Trevor Bryant and Bill Eime. Vocal performance and music production: James Byrne.

To view the words and listen to the song Click Here