HISTORY

HEADQUARTER BATTERY
ROYAL AUSTRALIAN ARTILLERY
VIETNAM 1968 - 1969 & 1971

Short History – RHQ / H.Q. Battery 12 Field Regiment R.A.A
First Tour 1968 / 69

The advance party of R.H.Q./H.Q. Battery departed Kingsford Smith Airport, Sydney, in the late evening of the 8^th of April 1968. We travelled via Qantas Airlines to Singapore and then on to Saigon where we arrived on the 9^th of April. It was a real eye opener to see the amount of Air traffic at Ton Son Nuit Air Base. We had never seen aircraft controlled on the ground by traffic lights before.

We then had a very nerve wracking flight in a Mini Hercules (piloted by a Vietnamese Air Force member, who was receiving instructions from a U.S. Flight Engineer reading from the Flight Manual). Our reception committee from 4th Field Regiment was rather perturbed to see the aircraft land on its nose wheel first, bounce two or three times and  settle on the runway eventually on its undercarriage. WELCOME TO LUCOMBE FIELD GENTLEMEN.

Headquarter Battery built up to near full strength over the next14 days. Operational orders were received, and on ANZAC DAY 1968, R.H.Q. and the Regimental Command Post moved by road to the U.S. / Thai base of “Bearcat”.

After several days of indoctrination into base life (U.S. Style) the RCP moved to F.S.B. Wattle with 102 and 105 Field Batteries. This was105 Field Batteries last Fire Support Base before its return to Australia.

On return to Bearcat preparations were made for the move to Fire Support base Coral.

The R.H.Q. recce party was duet to be on the ground at0720hrs on the 12^th of May and landing at K pad. However due to the lack of aircraft we landed at the 161RNZA Battery Artillery site on Z Pad.

The New Zealand 161 Field Battery was not due to leave F.S.B. Anderson until 0745 hrs, but some guns were already in the Gun area when the R.H.Q. Recce party arrived.

The R.S.M. of the Regiment had to walk from the 161 R.N.Z.A Artillery area to locate the position of the 102 Battery recce Party, where he was met by members of “The Big Red 1.”  They were securing the area for the fly in of 102 Field Battery and 1 R.A.R.

The history of Coral / Balmoral has been told many times, but it must be realized that some members of H.Q. Battery had only been in country just a few days before arriving at F.S.B. Coral. The two sad losses from the Regiment on the first night of the battle were Gunners Scott and Sawtell who had only been in country for 5 days before being killed in action on their first operation.

On the 13^th of May the FSCC arrived with the H.Q.1ATF, reinforcements for H.Q. Battery arrived at Coral on the 15^th of May. About a week later our Q.M .arrived with the cooks who provided fresh rations for the first time in weeks.

On return from Coral H.Q. Battery did not go on any further operation as such until it was deployed at F.S.B. Julia in November 1968. This was due to a most important change to our tactical / technical operations at Regimental level in that the regimental Command post was virtually disbanded. The Regimental Command Posts tasks were taken over by the Fire Support Control Centre at Task Force Headquarters. The FSCC was manned by H.Q. Battery personnel under the command of the B.C. H.Q. party.

The members of H.Q. Battery were also involved in providing Infantry standing patrols outside Nui Dat, F.O.s and Liaison Officers. L.O.s were based at the province Chiefs’ Command Post at Baria, the Thai Artillery Base at Long Tan on route 1 to Saigon and the ARVN Airborne Brigade H.Q. during their attachment to the 1A.T.F. from November 1968 to January 69.

In January all gun Batteries were engaged in operations outside of Nui Dat, Head quarter Battery was responsible for the local defence of the perimeter from the 161 Royal New Zealand Artillery site through to the area previously occupied by A Battery 2^nd / 35^th U.S. self propelled 155mm Artillery as well as the 104 Field Battery  area. We had to in addition keep up appearances that some Guns were still in Nui Dat in support of the 1A.T.F. base. A 105 M2A2 was obtained from reserve stock at Vung Tau. This Gun was used to Fire Harassment and interdiction programs into the Nui Thi Vis each night.

In March 1969 the responsibility for Fire Support for the 1A.T.F. was handed over to 1 Field Regiment and R.H.Q. and Head Quarter battery and R.H.Q. departed the shores of Vietnam, bound for Australia on the 11^th of March 1969.

                          WELL DONE THOSE YOUNG MEN!!!!!!

R.S.M. Les Partridge 12 Field Regiment 1968 – 1969.

BRIEF ON THE BATTLES OF CORAL AND BALMORAL
VIETNAM: MAY/JUNE 1968
(BELOW IS A WORD FOR WORD EXTRACT OF THE ACTUAL DOCUMENT)

Overview

The battles around Fire Support Bases (FSB) CORAL and BALMORAL, from 12 May to 6 Jun 1968. In terms of their duration and intensity, the numbers of units and men engaged on both sides and casualties incurred was greater than any other actions by Australians in the Vietnam War.¹

The deployment of 1^st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) as part of Operation Toan Thang ("Complete Victory') was the first brigade operation with all Combat Arms undertaken by Australians since World War II and the largest operation that 1 ATF conducted in Vietnam. I ATF activities in this period disrupted enemy infiltration and attacks against Saigon to such an extent that the Australian force experienced enemy regimental sized attacks on both FSB CORAL and BALMORAL.

Heavy contacts occurred throughout the period within the areas of operations (AO) dominated by these FSB, involving the infantry of 1^st Battalion (I RAR) and 3^rd Battalion (3 RAR) of the Royal Australian Regiment, supported by tanks and cavalry, artillery, and other Arms and Services. When 1 ATF redeployed in June 1968, known enemy casualties were over 300 killed, 7 wounded, II captured and 2 surrendered. I ATF casualties were 20 killed and 100 wounded.

The battles played a major part in securing Saigon from further attack in 1968. The opportunity to commemorate their importance is provided by the 40^th Anniversary of the battles in May/June 20O8.

Background to the Operation

Operation Toan Thang was launched in early April 1968. involving 70,000 US and Allied troops with the objectives of eliminating the enemy forces involved in the Tet Offensive of January/February 1968  and preventing a second offensive against Saigon and the large US base at Long Binh. The Australian Government agreed that I ATF could join this operation north of Saigon. well north of Nui Dat.  

In early May 1968, the enemy again attacked Saigon. Plans were developed by 1 ATF to deploy into the border area of Bien Hoa Province to help counter this offensive. From early May, substantial main force and local force units had moved through this area to attack Saigon. Five enemy regiments and the headquarters of 7^th North Vietnamese Army Division (7 NVA) were known to be operating in it.


1 ATF Deployment into the Area of Operations

On 12 May 68, 1 ATF commenced deployment into AO SURFERS. The force to be lifted in by helicopter that day comprised of 1 RAR. 3 RAR and the 12^th Field Regiment (12 Fd Regt) Royal Australian Artillery. comprising Regimental Headquarters (HQ) 102 Field Battery (102 Fd Bty) and 161 Field Battery Royal New Zealand Artillery (161 Fd Bty NZ). FSB CORAL was to be established with the artillery units protected by an infantry company of 3 RAR. The remaining infantry was to spread out to interdict enemy withdrawing from the Saigon area.

A road move was to follow on 13 May 68 comprising HQ I ATF, A Squadron 2nd Cavalry Regiment (A Sqn, 2 Cav Regt) Royal Australian Armoured Corps, 1^st Field Squadron (I Fd Sqn) Royal Australian Engineers, A Medium Battery 2/35 Battalion US Artillery (A 2^nd/35^th Bty USA), a detachment of 131 Division Locating Battery, Royal Australian Artillery and logistic elements.

The Australian airlift on 12 May was disrupted by diversion of helicopter support to the 1^st US Infantry Division, which was heavily engaged with NVA in the area, and, as a result, units arrived late in the day with little daylight left to complete defence preparations or move to night positions. The guns of 102 Fd Bty and 161 Fd Bty were positioned some 1.5 kilometres apart and the designated infantry protection company was isolated from them. The fly-in of 102 Fd Bty was observed by an clement of 141 NVA Regiment, 7 NVA, which, as we now know, withdrew from the fly-in area and commenced planning an attack on CORAL and the guns that night.

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¹   McAuley, Lex, The Battle of Coral Fire Support Base and Balmoral, May 1968, Hutchinson. Melb 1988, pp1-2

The Battle of CORAL

Initially on the night of 12/13 May, sporadic contacts with the NVA occurred as the infantry companies deployed to night positions, culminating in a heavy attack on D Company (D Coy) 1 RAR. killing two soldiers and wounding 11. 102 Fd Bty fired in support of D Company.

At 2.15 AM. a mortar and rocket barrage hit CORAL. followed by an NVA regimental assault from the north. The enemy overran part of the 102 Fd Bty gun position and the I RAR Mortar Platoon. Heavy close-quarter fighting ensued, including artillery firing anti-personnel rounds over open sights into the enemy mass, and surged confusedly around the mortar platoon and the forward guns. No 4 gun fired 84 rounds of direct fire, No 6 gun was in enemy hands and No 5 was laid on it ready to destroy it if it was moved. The other guns were hit by RPG or had ammunition set on fire. The NVA also penetrated up to the 12 Fd Regt Command Post and two gunners of HQ Bty were killed.

US and Australian artillery, helicopter gunship, 'Spooky² and close air support all provided support.   At dawn, enemy fire slackened and two patrols of gunners recaptured No 6 gun, cleared the front of the position and assisted the I RAR Mortar Platoon, which had suffered five killed and eight wounded out of eighteen soldiers. The NVA left fifty-two bodies around the mortars and guns although hundreds of drag marks pointed to much higher enemy casualties.

Following the first attack on CORAL, the rifle companies of 1 RAR were ordered back to the FSB where they established strong defence positions, bolstered by the arrival of armour, a US medium battery, engineer and other elements of the 1 ATF during 13 and 14 May 68. On 16 May at 2.45 AM, an NVA regimental size group again attacked CORAL, supported by heavy mortar and rocket fire, and against the companies of I RAR. all of which repulsed repeated attacks from 3.30 to 6 AM. Enemy losses were 34 confirmed killed; however it is estimated that several hundred bodies were removed. Australian losses were five killed and nineteen wounded, and the US Bty suffered two wounded.

After the second attack, CORAL was not seriously threatened again but was regularly subject to rocket and mortar attack. Aggressive patrols by I RAR resulted in daily contact with large enemy groups. 1 ATF was bolstered by the call forward of
C Squadron, 1 Armoured Regiment (C Sqn, 1 Armd Regt)³

 
The Battle of BALMORAL

3 RAR conducted interdiction operations in AO SURFERS until 24 May 68 when it moved further north into AO NEWPORT and occupied FSB BALMORAL on 25 May 68. A troop of tanks from C Sqn, 1 Armd Regt joined the battalion that afternoon. From this day, 3 RAR was in constant contact with the enemy. In the early hours of 26 May 1968, FSB BALMORAL was attacked by all NVA infantry battalion from 165 NVA Regt.   This assault was repulsed by 3 RAR and the combined direct fire of 2 Tp C Sqn I Armd Regt and 2 Tp A Sqn 2 Cav Regt. The tanks fired anti-personnel canister rounds to great effect, and concentrated artillery fire and air support broke up the enemy assault.

At 2.45 AM on 28 May 1968, a regimental attack was mounted against FSB BALMORAL and was sustained until 5 AM, resulting in 55 enemy killed and six POW. Australian casualties were one killed and six wounded.   During this attack, the enemy assaulted the rifle companies of 3 RAR manning three sectors of the defensive perimeter of BALMORAL.   In two of these, the assault was straight into the muzzles of two tanks. The enemy attacks were beaten off on the perimeter defences

Conclusion 1 ATF played a large role in the success of Operation Toan Thang.   Between 12 May and 6 June 1968, its units were constantly in contact with a numerically superior enemy.   Following the defensive battles at CORAL and BALMORAL, 1 ATF action clearly swung to the offensive, denying the enemy use of his 'safe areas' and blocking his infiltration and attack corridor to Saigon and Bien Hoa. The battles were significant because of their size, duration and the opposing main force NVA.

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²    US Dakota aircraft equipped with rapid fire mini-guns
³    Equipped with Centurion Main Battle Tanks